Christian August Crusius (1715-1775) was a Pietist Theologian and philosopher of the Leipzig School, and
the most systematic opponent of the Leibnizian-Wolffian rationalism of his time. He critiqued the Leibnizian
possible worlds doctrine on the basis that Leibniz’s God is simply not the kind of thing that could function
as a possible cause of any worlds that were not the “best,” therefore these other worlds are not real
possibilities. They would contradict the nature of their cause and so are only apparent possibilities that
disappear upon proper reflection. The current interpretation of Crusius’ positive response to this problem in
his metaphysics says that Crusius argues for a position in which other worlds really are possible, i.e., where
they do not contradict the nature of their cause (God), and that he rests his case here. Proponents of this
view—Hamann (2021), Krouglov (2022), Messina (2016)—believe that Crusius says nothing about whether
or not any other worlds really do exist because we cannot possibly know; this is up to God alone. I claim
that the prevailing interpretation is mistaken and that Crusius’ true argument in his metaphysics aims to
show that other worlds (at least one other) really do exist with an “indisputable” (moral) certainty, his
highest degree of probability, and that their existence is entailed by the essential nature of God and the
immortality of the human soul.
Katedra filosofie a religionistiky TF JU Teologická fakulta JU
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